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The Development Problem under Embodiment
Raouf Boucekkine, Blanca Martínez, and Cagri Saglam*
Abstract
This paper studies technology adoption in an optimal growth model with embodied technical change. The
economy consists of the final good sector, the capital sector, and the technology sector which role is the imi-
tation of exogenous innovations. Scarce labor resources are allocated to the technology and final good
sectors. The final good is allocated to consumption and to the capital sector. The authors analytically char-
acterize the long run optimal allocations. Using a calibrated version of the model, they find that an 
acceleration in the rate of embodied technical change should not be responded by an immediate and strong
adoption effort. Instead, adoption labor should decrease in the short run, and the optimal technological gap
is shown to increase either in the short or in the long run. The state of the institutions and policies around
the technology sector is key in the design of the optimal adoption timing.
1. Introduction
The analysis of the relative advantages of globalization has become one of the most
interesting topics in the recent years. Behind this renewed interest in a somewhat clas-
sical issue in development economics (i.e., whether openness is a prerequisite to
growth), one should at first mention the increasing popularity and activism of the anti-
globalization movement. In a recent contribution, Segerstrom (2003) discusses the
typical anti-globalization arguments as included in Naomi Klein’s highly influential No
Logo book. In particular, he discusses the view according to which trade liberalization,
as it is conducted in developing countries, is merely spoliation of their populations.
Using recent empirical papers on this issue (Wacziarg and Welch, 2002), Segerstrom
points out that trade-centered reforms have a robust positive effect on economic
growth. Though this judgment does not apply systematically to all the trade reforms
undertaken in the developing countries, as we will see later, there is a growing con-
sensus among economists that trade restrictions can hardly serve as long-run growth
enhancing policies.
Admittedly, technology transfers play a central role in the story. Ideally, technology
transfers generate spillovers to the whole developing economy, inducing a durable
upward shift in the technological frontier of this economy. In practice, technology
transfers may be less efficient. First, technology adoption programs are usually under-
mined by the institutional barriers inherent to developing countries. As reported by
Niosi et al. (1995) using a survey of the performances of some 50 major international
technology transfer projects, the costs associated with lack of transferee expertise and
poor training, and those induced by the administrative restrictions set by the host gov-
ernments are key in explaining the success or failure of a project. This is hardly the
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case of the open South, following the terminology of Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(2003).
Second, even in the case of the open South, even if the host governments are keen
at easing technology transfers and facilitating their implementation, the expected
spillovers may not take place in the short run. It goes without saying that local condi-
tions are crucial in determining the magnitude of the spillovers. For example, it appears
that spillovers are likelier in sectors with simpler technologies.1
This paper is precisely devoted to study how the local conditions should be taken
into account to design optimal technology adoption policy, with special emphasis on
the short run. We share with Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2003) the view that more
openness yields more output and a lower technological gap in the long run. Our model
delivers the same results. However, we emphasize the following point: Given the “local
conditions” in the South, in particular given the scarce skill resources and the limited
capacity of technology absorption, the optimal pace of technology adoption is 
non-trivial, and should be carefully determined. In particular, massive and immediate
adoption is hardly optimal as we will show later.
This question is at the heart of the current debate on the North–South digital divide.
Many bodies now exist that all focus on the stakes involved by the digital divide.
The G8 Dot Force, established at the 2000 Okinawa G8 summit, was among the first.
More recently, in 2002, the United Nations have launched their Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) Task Force, and it is frequent to read in the offi-
cial publications of many industrial countries some explicit statements like the 
following: “bridging the North–South digital divide is a priority for the foreign 
cooperation policy.”2
In this context, many developing countries have undertaken a significant effort in
ICT equipment investment, specially in Asia and Latin America. Beside the issue of
the connectivity of the South, which is certainly very important to address properly,
one may question the relevance of the North–South digital divide problem as a key
and urgent development issue, and the subsequent technology adoption and transfer
programs. After all, the ICT growth enhancing effect is still at the heart of a tough
debate even on the US economy (Gordon, 2000)! The economic rational behind
massive and immediate technology transfers is even more doubtful in the case of ICT
because the transferred technologies are sophisticated, and the technological advances
are embodied in capital goods. This is a problem given the scarce skill resources and
the limited capacity of technology absorption in the host countries. This paper is pri-
marily designed to investigate this point in details and to develop a theory of economic
development under embodiment.
The role of embodiment in the growth process of the industrialized countries has
been intensively studied in the recent years, notably in the US economy (Greenwood
and Yorukoglu, 1997). Our objective is to study to which extent the embodiment char-
acteristic matters in the optimal pace of technology adoption in a developing country.
The basic structure of the model is the following. The economy consists of three 
sectors: the sector producing the final good, the sector producing the capital goods, and
the technology sector. Technological progress is embodied in capital goods. The tech-
nology sector does not conduct any innovative R&D activity. Its unique role is the 
adoption (or imitation) of the innovations coming from abroad, as in Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom (2003). However, the technological absorption is limited in that it is never
feasible to close the technological gap with respect to abroad as in Nelson and Phelps
(1966). We consider an optimal growth model in which a benevolent central planner
enforces the social optimum by choosing the best consumption, investment and 
EMBODIMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 43
© 2006 The Authors
Journal compilation © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006
adoption patterns for the economy.3 To this end, he has to settle some resource allo-
cations problems involved in the economy. For example, he has to ensure that the
(scarce) skilled labor resources are optimally assigned to both the technology and the
final good sectors. What could be an optimal adoption plan in such a context? How
should the economy react to a technological acceleration? Is an immediate and massive
adoption effort optimal in this case?
To tackle these issues, we organize the paper as follows. The next section gives the
analytical structure of the model. It also derives the corresponding balanced growth
paths and some interesting comparative statics. Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of
the short-term dynamics. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model




Equation (1) gives the production function in the final good sector at any date t. The
final good (Yt) is produced with capital (Kt) and labor (Lt). At is technological progress
in the final good sector. Note that this form of technological progress is independent
of the pace of capital accumulation, it is therefore disembodied. The parameter a
measures as usual the capital share.
Equation (2) is the production function in the capital sector. Capital is produced
according to a linear production function with a unique input, the final good.The amount
of final good used to increase the capital stock and to replace the depreciated fraction 
of it (namely dKt−1 where d is the depreciation rate) is denoted It. qt is technological
progress in the capital good sector. In contrast to At, qt is specific to capital goods: It is
embodied in capital goods.Equation (2) is exactly the production function of equipment
goods considered by Greenwood et al. (1997). However, in contrast to these authors,
we shall endogenize the embodied part of technological progress, as measured by qt.
Precisely, we assume that there is a third sector, say an imitation sector, which pro-
duction technology is given by equation (3). This sector ensures an increasing pattern
for the level of embodied technical progress, qt. q°t is the level of (embodied) technical
progress abroad at date t. The labor resources allocated to this sector is ut, and dt is an
exogenous variable representing any potential shock to this sector. For example,
an upward shift in dt may represent either: (i) an exogenous improvement of the pro-
ductivity of labor in the imitation sector (coming from an improvement in the quality
of the skills), or, (ii) a trade policy reform by the host countries easing technology trans-
fers, or, (iii) a weaker intellectual property rights system in the innovative countries,
following Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2003). It is readily checked that equation (3)
implies that the level of embodied technological progress in the economy at date t, qt,
is a convex combination of the technological level abroad at date t, and of the tech-
nological level of the economy at t − 1, qt−1. In the case of a developing country, we
must assume: qt−1 < q°t . It follows that qt < q°t , ∀t. The technological absorption capacity
of a developing country is limited, and the technological gap cannot be closed at any
fixed date t. Indeed, the technological gap, TGt, at t, may be defined according to Nelson
and Phelps (1966), as (q°t − qt)/qt, which by equation (3) implies:
q q d u q qt t t t t t= + −( )−1 q o .
K q I Kt t t t= + −( ) −1 1d
Y A K Lt t t t= −a a1
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(4)
It follows that the technological gap can only vanish asymptotically. And it does so
if and only if either the exogenous variable dt or the labor assignment ut goes to in-
finity when t tends to infinity. In this paper, we assume that the productivity variable
dt has no (positive or negative) trend.We also assume that the (skilled) labor resources
of this developing economy are limited at any date. Either dt or the amount of skilled
labor can increase permanently following an exogenous shock but, since our goal is to
model under-developed economies, we do not incorporate any internal or external
mechanism assuring a cumulative and balanced law of motion for these two magni-
tudes. More precisely, the following resource constraints hold:
(5)
(6)
Therefore, we assume that total (skilled) labor resources are constant over time and
we normalize them to 1. These resources have to be allocated to two sectors: the sector
producing the final good and the imitation sector. The final good is used for con-
sumption, Ct, and as an input in the production of capital goods, It. How should the
economy choose the allocation of labor resources to the production of the final good
vs. the imitation sector? How should the economy choose the allocation of the final
good to consumption vs. the capital sector?
We shall address these questions within an optimal growth set-up in the next section.
A final comment before. We assume that there is no interaction between the em-
bodied and disembodied components of technological progress: qt is endogenous and
At is not. According to some New Economy enthusiasts, the productivity gains regis-
tered in the capital goods sectors (e.g., hardware production) will eventually spillover
to the rest of the economy, which is likely to lead to a permanent rise in aggregate pro-
ductivity growth. That is qt growth will have an impact on At after a (long) adjustment
period. This view of embodiment is far from unanimously accepted (Gordon, 2000),
and there is no unquestionable statistical evidence so far supporting it. Accordingly,
we assume that there is no inter-action between qt and At. The effects of an increasing
level of disembodied technical progress will be simply examined through permanent
shocks exercises on At.
The Central Planner Problem
We consider the following optimal growth problem:
subject to equation (1) to (5), given q−1 and K−1 and the corresponding positivity con-
straints (notably 0 ≤ ut ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ Lt ≤ 1). U(⋅) is a standard utility function and b < 1
is the time discounting factor. The interior solution of this optimization problem is
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and the transversality conditions: limt→∞ltqt = 0, and limt→∞l′tKt = 0, where w, l and l′
are the multipliers associated with the labor market clearing condition (5), with the
imitation technology (3), with the production function of capital goods (2), respectively.
Equation (7) gives the optimal intertemporal consumption (or saving) plan. It is a
completely standard Keynes–Ramsey rule if one abstracts from the presence of the q
terms. In particular, it implies that the optimal growth rate of consumption is deter-
mined by the marginal productivity of capital aAtKta−1Lt1−a, the discount rate b, and the
depreciation rate d. For example, the higher the marginal productivity of capital, the
stronger the incentives to save and the higher the expected growth rate of consump-
tion. When we account for embodied technological progress, the Keynes–Ramsey rule
is modified in two aspects. Since the capital goods are increasingly efficient over time,
the marginal productivity of capital should incorporate this efficiency. It is expressed
in efficiency units in equation (7), i.e., it is multiplied by qt.
On the other hand, it should be noted that, consistently with Greenwood et al.
(1997), the price of the capital good in terms of the consumption good is 1/qt in our
model: For each unit of forgone consumption at t, the economy can build up qt units
of capital at t. Suppose that qt is increasing, then the relative price of capital is decreas-
ing, and the consumption good is expected to be more expensive over time, and 
consumption is likely to fall in the future. This effect is called obsolescence effect by
Boucekkine et al. (2003); it is inherent to embodied technical change and it tends to
lower the growth effects of the latter.
Equations (8) and (9) are the optimality conditions with respect to production labor
and adoption labor, respectively. In each equation, the marginal productivity of labor
is equal to the shadow wage. Since labor is homogenous, we have a unique shadow
wage. Equation (10) is the optimal condition with respect to qt. The LHS is the benefit
from a marginal increase in qt: such an increase will allow to raise the capital stock by
It in efficiency units, which is equal by equation (2) to (Kt − (1 − d)Kt−1)/qt, and by It /qt
in physical units (in terms of the consumption good), which in turn allows to raise
utility by U′(Ct)It/qt. The RHS gives the cost of a marginal increase in qt. Notice that
lt is by definition, the shadow price of qt. The RHS of equation (10) is the marginal
cost of qt: It includes the usual intertemporal term lt − blt+1, retrieving future value
gains from the shadow price, plus the less usual term ltdtuqt . This term comes entirely
from the specification of the imitation technology (3): a marginal increase in qt costs
indeed 1 + dtuqt , to be multiplied by the shadow price to get the welfare cost.
We now turn to the analysis of the steady state growth paths.
The Balanced Growth Paths: Existence and Comparative Statics
From now on, we assume a logarithmic utility function. We define the steady-state
growth paths as usual in exogenous growth theory: along the balanced growth path, ut
and Lt are constant and the remaining variables grow at constant rates. Denoting by
gx the long-run growth factor of a variable Xt and its long-run level, we have the
following simple properties:
X
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Proposition 1. If q°t grows at rate g > 1, then all the other variables grow at strictly 
positive rates with
Not surprisingly, the growth rate of the capital stock is higher than the other vari-
ables: the capital stock is expressed in efficiency units and as such, its growth rate is
the sum of the growth rates of q and I. The long-term levels are much harder to char-
acterize. In order to simplify a little bit, we use equation (9) to eliminate the multiplier
l. The resulting eight restrictions are as follows:
The stationary long-term system appears very messy. Nonetheless, we can prove that
it has always a unique solution.
Proposition 2. If g > 1, a unique stationary equilibrium exists for our economy.
A detailed proof of this claim is reported in the Appendix. We can also prove ana-
lytically the following comparative statics with respect to the technological parameters
g and d appearing in the imitation technology.
Proposition 3. Denote by s = I/Y the long-term investment ratio. The long-run 
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The proof is in the Appendix.A technological acceleration abroad induces a stronger
adoption effort. However, this increment is not enough to lower the long-term tech-
nological gap. This property comes from an important arbitrage settlement in the
model. When u goes up, the amount of labor devoted to production decreases, which
in turn tends to decrease output and consumption. Moreover, the consumption share
in output goes down when the rate of embodied technological progress is raised. It is
very important to understand why this property holds. Recall that the growth rate of
q is precisely the rate of decline of the relative price of capital. Hence, when g increases,
this rate of decline decreases, inducing a typical substitution effect unfavorable to 
consumption. Overall, consumption tends to decrease for two reasons when a techno-
logical acceleration occurs. A central planner who cares about consumption per capita
should consequently try to alleviate the induced fall in consumption by producing a
moderate adoption effort. Social welfare maximization is indeed incompatible with a
sharp adoption effort in the long run.
The same mechanisms are involved when the productivity d of the imitation sector
goes up. As we mentioned above, this could be the result of a trade reform facilitating
adoption, or a permanent improvement in the skills of the employees of the technol-
ogy sector, or a weaker protection of intellectual property rights in the innovative
countries. In such a case, the fraction of labor devoted to adoption goes down, but the
technological gap goes down too. Given the expression of the long run technological
gap, this means that the product duq increases when d goes up despite the reduction
in u. It is not hard to understand this result. Productivity improvements in adoption
allow to increase the level of technological progress even though the labor contribu-
tion to this activity diminishes. In such a case, more labor is assigned to production,
and the economy gains a double advantage: More production (and so more consump-
tion and more welfare) and lower technological gap. In other words, the first-best 
decisions allow to reduce both the output and technological gaps. Finally, in contrast
to the shock on the rate of embodied technical change, a rising d does not alter the
consumption and investment shares in output. Both investment and consumption will
rise, following the output increment, but they do so at the same growth rate. There is
a fundamental reason for this. In contrast to the shock on g, a rising d does not alter
the rate of decline of the relative price of capital (precisely equal to g), which is the
crucial determinant of the output composition.
What happens if the technological improvements occur in the final good sector via
the disembodied technological progress variable, A? The following proposition sum-
marizes the findings regarding this question.
Proposition 4. An increase in A rises (detrended) output, investment, consumption and
capital though it has no effect on the investment rate. Moreover, a change in A does
not alter the allocation of labor resources between adoption and production and the
induced technological gap.
The proof is trivial, see the Appendix. A rise in A has a direct income effect which
rises consumption and investment as output goes up. However, the investment rate is
unchanged. As in the case of the shock in d, there is no change in the rate of decline
of the relative price of capital, and the composition of output remains the same. Much
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of the allocation of labor resources across activities, which may be surprising at first
glance. However, one should keep in mind that an increase in A raises the shadow
wage (since labor marginal productivity is shifted upwards). Since labor is homogenous
and given the optimal labor decisions (8) and (9), the direct wage impact of the shock
in A is identical in the two sectors (final good and technology sectors), and there is no
reason to alter the initial allocation of labor resources across sectors.As a consequence,
the technological gap is also insensitive to the latter variable, since it entirely depends
on the adoption of investment-specific technological progress. If the adoption effort is
unaffected, the technological gap is.
3. Dynamics
Let us now study the transition dynamics to the steady-state growth paths. Recall that
the main objective of this paper is to investigate whether an immediate and “massive”
adoption effort is optimal in developing countries. We first rewrite the model in terms
of the detrended variables. The stationarized dynamic system is reported in the appen-
dix. We simulate a calibrated version of this system.4
The benchmark calibration is given by Table 1.
The parameters a, the capital share, b, the time discounting rate, d, the depreciation
rate of capital, and A, the level of disembodied technical change, have been fixed to
some usual values. For a fixed value of d, the remaining parameters g, the rate of
embodied technical change, and q, the “elasticity” of labor in the imitation technology,
have been chosen so as to have share of consumption in GDP around 70%, and an
adoption cost, as measured by the ratio “wages paid to the technology sector” to GDP,
around 10% in the benchmark case. The latter reference value has been given by
Jovanovic (1997). In order to illustrate the importance of the institutional and policy
aspects, we additionally consider another calibration which only differs from the
benchmark in the value of d. Concretely, we consider the case where d equals ten 
times the benchmark value. Table 2 gives the long-term properties of the two 
parameterizations.
When the economy benefits from policy and institutional environment favorable to
technology adoption, the optimal amount of labor resources allocated to the latter
activity need not be large, and actually, it is shown to be lower relatively to the bench-
mark case. This allows to increase (detrended) output, consumption and investment,
without worsening the technological gap, which indeed decreases markedly. These
properties reflect the comparative statics demonstrated in Proposition 3. We now turn
to the short-term dynamics. We consider three permanent and unexpected 1% shocks
affecting the economy from t = 0: a shock on the rate of embodied technical progress,
g ; a shock of d and a shock on the level of disembodied technical progress A. The solu-
tion paths are given in Figures 1 to 6. Each solution path represents the evolution of
the percentage deviation of a given variable with respect to the initial steady state
value.
Before moving to the results of the announced numerical experiments, one should
mention that for each shock, the obtained solution path is the unique optimal path.
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Table 1. The Benchmark Parameterization
a b g d q d A
0.4 0.97 1.02 0.07 0.9 0.12 1
First of all, all the considered stationary equilibria are locally saddle-point in the sense
of Blanchard–Kahn (1980), that is the set of eigenvalues computed for each station-
ary equilibrium is composed of as many eigenvalues as non-redundant (or indepen-
dent) forward non-predetermined variables in the linearized model.5 For example, in
the benchmark model, we find that the linearized model (around the steady state)
shows up 2 eigenvalues with modulus larger than one (the highest equal to 1.168) for
two independent forward variables and two redundancies. So the Blanchard–Kahn
conditions for a saddle-point equilibrium are met, and we find indeed the same local
spectral configuration for all the considered stationary equilibria.6
Second, by a Hartman–Grobman like theorem, the saddle-point property is kept in
a neighborhood of the considered equilibria, and since we only consider small shocks
in our experiments, we are unlikely to break down this property. To be sure about that,
we run some sensitivity tests, and it turns out that the solution paths are robust to
changes in the experimental parameters.7 Hence, for each experiment, the computed
path is unique stable.
Optimal Adoption under Technological Acceleration
We first analyze how the economy reacts to the g and the A shocks, as reflected in
Figures 1 to 3 for the benchmark case. The main lessons to be drawn from the 
experiments are:
(i) A technological acceleration through g does not induce an intensification of the
adoption effort in the short run. Instead, the optimal amount of labor devoted to 
the technology sector is below the initial steady state value for around eight periods
after the shock. Since the technological acceleration is permanent, the economy will
converge to a higher adoption labor long-run value (by Proposition 3). Hence, it has
to increase its adoption effort after a while. Whether it does so soon or late depends,
in particular, on the settlement of the intertemporal arbitrages and resource competi-
tion problems present in the model. Among other relevant factors, time discounting or
impatience induces a short-run decrease in labor adoption so as to increase labor in
production, which in turn would increase consumption in the short run.
Another important factor is the chosen pattern for the rate of decline of the rela-
tive price of capital. In the long run, this rate goes up, involving a change in the 
composition of output, favorable to investment. So the long-run equilibrium is un-
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Table 2. The Long-term Implications of the Calibration












favorable to consumption for two main reasons: a higher adoption labor and a bigger
investment rate. In such a context, an optimal reaction in the short run, given the dis-
counted nature of the objective function, implies more production labor and/or a lower
investment rate. In Figures 1 and 3, we see that while the adoption labor goes clearly
down in the short run, there is a very slight increase in the investment rate at t = 1,
immediately followed by a long transition below the initial steady state value. By
choosing such a behavior, the economy lets the technological gap increase from t = 0
(to the new steady state value). Not surprisingly, welfare maximization does not
produce a decreasing pattern for the technological gap, neither in the long run (as
proved in Proposition 3), nor in the short run.
(ii) The A shock produces much trickier outcomes. Figures 1 to 3 show a slight
increase in the adoption effort, an almost immobile technological gap and a sharp rise
in the investment rate, in the short run. It seems that the shock is almost entirely
absorbed by the quantity variables, even in the short run! We know by Proposition 4
that only these variables are affected in the long run. Whether the obtained short-run
dynamics are robust to changes in the environment (notably to the value of d) is an
interesting issue that will be tackled in the next sub-section. Yet it is important to
understand why a shock on the level of disembodied technical progress can produce
the results we have obtained in the benchmark case.
Notice that such a shock raises the marginal productivity of both production factors,
labor and capital. So, it tends to increase both. Now, one should recall that the capital
stock (in efficiency units) can be raised either by investing more in the capital sector
(which is detrimental to consumption) or by increasing the efficiency level of the new
capital goods, which in turn consists in increasing adoption labor since g is fixed. The
latter strategy would be attractive if the technology sector could ensure a gain in 
the efficiency of capital goods (i.e., a rise in q) big enough to compensate the induced
labor allocation unfavorable to the production labor in a context of rising marginal
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Figure 1. Percentage Deviation of the Adoption Labor
productivity of labor. If not, the adjustment will mainly take place via the quantity vari-
ables. This is exactly what happens in our benchmark case. Output, consumption and
investment rise. However, the increment in output (and in consumption) is markedly
lower than the increment in investment, which is far from surprising since for example
production labor slightly decreases. Consequently, the investment rate sharply rises at
t = 1. Finally, the resulting technological gap is almost constant over time because of
the very limited scope of the reallocation of labor resources. Again, the technological
acceleration does not produce any short-term intense adoption effort. However, in con-
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Figure 3. Percentage Deviation of the Investment Rate
trast to the acceleration in the rate of embodied technical change, the response of the
economy is now characterized by an investment boom in the short run.
Institutions, Policy and Optimal Adoption
We now study the robustness of the results listed above to changes in the policy vari-
able d. This is done in two steps.
(i) Figures 1 to 3 also report the results of a permanent shock on d for the bench-
mark economy. From Proposition 3, we know that the economy will converge to a
lower adoption labor, but will achieve a smaller technological gap. So in the long run,
labor allocation is favorable to the production sector, and to consumption. In the short
run, the economy takes advantage of the improvement in education and/or trade policy
and institutions by sharply raising adoption labor. So, in contrast to the case of tech-
nological accelerations, institutional and policy improvements in the technology sector
can carry out a massive adoption effort in the short run. Note however, that the 
subsequent decrease in production labor does not lead to a drastic cut in the con-
sumption level. Indeed, at the same time, the optimal allocation of the final good is
detrimental to the capital sector (see Figure 3).
(ii) In a last experiment, we study the response of the economy to technological
accelerations for a value of d, ten times bigger than in the benchmark case. The results
are reported in Figures 4 to 6. In the case of the g shock, we get no massive and im-
mediate adoption effort after the acceleration, exactly as in the benchmark case. There
are, however, some clear quantitative differences. First of all, the initial drop in the
adoption effort is less sharp and it takes only four periods to the economy to get above
the initial steady state value (it takes eight periods in the benchmark case). Hence,
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Figure 4. Percentage Deviation of the Adoption Labor when d is High
under better institutions and policy for monitoring technology adoption, the intense
phase of adoption starts much earlier, and it converges to a higher adoption labor value
and to a lower technological gap (in percentage change with respect to the steady state
value).
In the case of the A shock, the differences with respect to the benchmark case are
not only quantitative. Recall that such a shock induces an increase in the capital stock
which can be achieved either by investing more in the capital sector or by increasing
adoption labor. Recall also that the latter is an attractive decision if the technology
sector could ensure a gain in the efficiency of capital big enough to compensate the
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Figure 6. Percentage Deviation of the Investment Rate when d is High
induced drop in the production labor. In the benchmark case, this condition fails to
hold. In the case of large d values, it holds. As a consequence, both adoption labor and
the investment rate are boosted in the short run.The pattern of adoption labor induces
a decrease in the technological gap in the short run. This is the unique case we find for
early and intense adoption efforts, as a response to technological accelerations. Note
that this case only concerns the level of disembodied technical progress, and more
importantly, it is generated for d values large enough. That is to say the state of policy
and institutions around the technology sector is absolutely crucial in the design of
optimal technology adoption schedules.
4. Concluding Remarks
Using a simple three-sector model with embodied technical progress, scarce skilled
labor resources and a limited capacity of technological absorption, we study the
optimal timing of technology adoption. Our main result is the sub-optimality of an
immediate increase in the adoption effort in response to an acceleration in the pace
of embodied technical progress. The phase of intense adoption (as measured by the
share of labor resources devoted to this activity) should be delayed, the exact optimal
timing depending on the education and trade policies and institutions at work in the
technology sector. In the context of the digital divide debate, our model implies that
the latter should not be on the top of any program of economic development (abstract-
ing away from the connectivity issue). The specific nature of the technological progress
conveyed by the ICT and the weakness of the technology sectors in the South makes
this debate irrelevant in our view.
Regarding the globalization debate, our model displays some simple, but useful
lessons. The structure of the imitation sector is key in the performances of the devel-
oping country, both in terms of long-term income and technological gap. A low 
productivity imitation sector is a strong signal that the economy will end with a 
low income and large technological gap in the long run. Since the productivity of the
imitation sector strongly depends on the accessibility to the best technologies, global-
ization is good if it triggers accessibility to these technologies. However, our model
shows that for a fixed imitation sector, there exists an optimal pace of technology trans-
fer. Massive and immediate technology adoption is hardly optimal, and this makes the
case against the proponents of a globalization abstracting away from the local con-
ditions of the national economies.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
By means of successive substitutions, one can reduce the system of eight equilibrium
restrictions to a single implicit equation involving only u:
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Thus there exists a unique u* ∈(0, 1) which satisfies G(u) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
The comparative statics are derived explicitly. For sake of simplicity, let’s denote by
We have:
It is clear that the denominator is always negative for all values of u. The sign of 
the expression depends on (u(1 + duq)/(1 − u) − M). And ∀u, such that G(u) = 0,
(u(1 + duq)/(1 − u) − M) < 0. Thus, (∂u/∂g) > 0.
The sign of the expression depends on:
For sake of simplicity, without loss of generality, let d = 1. Then, we have:
so that (∂TG/∂γ) > 0.
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Since , we get:
and
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is trivial. Indeed: ∂x/∂A = (x/A)[1/(1 − a)] > 0, where x stands for K, C, Y and
I. Moreover, from the explicit expression of s given just above, ∂s/∂A = 0.
The Stationarized Dynamic System
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Notes
1. See the excellent work of Grether, 1999, on the Mexican case.
2. French inter-ministerial committee, July 10, 2002.
3. Since we are considering optimality issues, this is by no way a limitation. We could have con-
sidered a decentralized set-up à la Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2003), but the computation of
the short-term dynamics is so problematic in the latter case that we turn to an optimal growth
framework to make our point.
4. We use Dynare, the package developed by Juillard (1996), for the simulation and stability
assessment of nonlinear forward-looking variables.
5. The computation of the eigenvalues requires a state-space representation, called the 
Blanchard–Kahn form, which is not generally directly available from the structural model,
due to collinearity inducing non-invertibility of matrices. Redundancies should be removed, and
that is exactly what Juillard’s software, Dynare does.
6. However, there is no way to establish this property analytically given that we don’t have
closed-form stationary equilibria, and more specifically, because the analytical obtention of the
Blanchard–Kahn form—namely the removal of redundancies—is impossible.
7. For an extensive and mathematically founded exposition of these sensitivity tests in the
context of Newton–Raphson relaxation algorithms as the software Dynare, see Boucekkine
(1995).
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